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Introduction 
 
 
Russia’s New Military Doctrine 
NATO, the United States and the “Colour Revolutions” 
Margarete Klein 
Russia’s new Military Doctrine is characterised by its close linkage of foreign and 
domestic threat perceptions. While the former relate to NATO and the United States, 
the Kremlin’s concerns over the latter revolve around the spectre of a Russian “Maidan”. 
To prevent that, and to assert its claims to a zone of influence in the post-Soviet space, 
Moscow is in particular expanding its “non-linear” warfare capabilities. This is precise-
ly the point to which the West has to date failed to find an adequate response. 
 
President Vladimir Putin signed the new 
Russian Military Doctrine into effect on 25 
December 2014, replacing the version of 
February 2010. It was drafted by a Security 
Council working group, and had been 
commissioned before the outbreak of the 
Ukraine crisis in July 2013. So as well as 
representing a response to the current con-
flict escalation, the document also addresses 
broader changes in Russia’s domestic and 
foreign policy environment. 
Focus on the United States 
and NATO 
Like the 2010 version, the new Military 
Doctrine distinguishes between military 
dangers and threats. Dangers are precursors 
of threats that contain the “real possibility 
of the outbreak of a military conflict”. 
Scenarios relating explicitly to NATO and 
implicitly to the United States continue to 
top the list of external military dangers, 
with explicit mention of “expanding the 
bloc”, the desire to “move military infra-
structure” closer to Russia’s borders, and 
the “deployment (buildup) of military con-
tingents of foreign states” in neighbouring 
states. The latter would include the Readi-
ness Action Plan that NATO agreed for its 
eastern European members in September 
2014. The Doctrine also mentions NATO’s 
expansion and its “desire to endow the force 
potential” of the Alliance with “global func-
tions” in violation of international law. 
What this is driving at is out-of-area opera-
tions conducted either without a UN 
mandate (Kosovo 1999) or supposedly in 
violation of one (Libya 2011). 
The Kremlin fears that Washington 
is undermining the strategic balance of 
power. While both countries still possess 
nuclear arsenals of similar dimensions, 
Moscow now lags behind – in some cases 
a long way behind – in developing new con-
ventional defensive and offensive capabili-
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ties. In line with this, the new Doctrine 
classes as military dangers “strategic missile 
defence systems”, “the intention to station 
weapons in space”, “deployment of strategic 
nonnuclear precision weapons systems” 
and – explicitly for the first time in 2014 – 
“global strike” capabilities. The passages on 
cyberwarfare and “subversive activities of 
special services” are also new. 
The list of “military threats” has not 
changed since 2010. But in a context of ten-
sion, more of the outlined scenarios now 
apply to the United States and NATO: “an 
abrupt exacerbation of the military-politi-
cal situation (interstate relations”, “a show 
of military force” through exercises in 
Russia’s neighbourhood or “obstructing” 
state and military command and control, 
for example through a “global strike”. 
Transnational Dangers and 
Regional Conflicts 
Even if the analysis of dangers and threats 
focuses rather more strongly than before on 
NATO and above all the United States, it is 
by no means restricted to Western actors. 
Attention is also directed towards transna-
tional dangers, which are listed in greater 
detail than in 2010: global extremism and 
terrorism, cross-border organised crime, 
and arms and drug smuggling. Russia is 
particularly concerned to guard against 
spill-over effects on its vulnerable southern 
flank. It is worst affected by drug smug-
gling from Afghanistan, where the Kremlin 
fears that the ISAF withdrawal will boost 
such activities and give free rein to Islamist 
organisations. Already today there are 
several hundred Russian citizens fighting 
with the Islamic State. 
The Military Doctrine also directs closer 
attention to developments in Russia’s im-
mediate neighbourhood. This is a direct 
consequence of the Ukraine crisis, as well 
as an expression of a generally heightened 
Russian assertiveness in the post-Soviet 
space. The establishment there of regimes 
that “threaten Russian interests” is catego-
rised as a military danger, as are “inter-
ethnic and interfaith tensions” and “ter-
ritorial claims against the Russian Feder-
ation”, which gain a sharper edge in the 
aftermath of the annexation of Crimea. 
Fear of a Russian “Maidan” 
The real new aspect the Military Doctrine, 
however, consists in the close linkage 
of foreign and domestic risks and the in-
creased emphasis placed on the latter. 
Two scenarios are uppermost: Firstly, the 
possibility of ethnic and religious strife 
escalating and eroding the internal cohe-
sion of the multi-ethnic state. Such tensions 
are visible in Islamist tendencies in the 
North Caucasus, as well as growth in Rus-
sian nationalism. 
But most space is devoted to the second 
scenario: “activities aimed at forcibly chang-
ing the constitutional system of the Russian 
Federation”. The Military Doctrine reveals 
just how strongly the Moscow leadership 
fears for the stability of its authority and 
how vulnerable it feels to societal protest. 
The legitimacy of Putin’s system is rooted 
above all in its economic success. And that 
is now threatened by the impact of Western 
sanctions and the low oil price. Here the 
Russian leadership keeps a particularly 
watchful eye on “activities intended to have 
an information effect on the population, 
above all on young citizens”, which alludes 
to the dangers it sees emanating from 
social networks and the new media. 
The Military Doctrine makes no depar-
ture from Moscow’s tendency to “securitize” 
domestic problems. The Kremlin describes 
the Arab Spring and the “colour revolu-
tions” as externally instigated processes 
and sees itself as the target of western 
regime-change plans. Alongside the mili-
tary might of NATO and the United States, 
the soft capabilities of the European Union 
are also increasingly perceived as a danger. 
This narrative construct serves to suppress 
domestic dissent and externalise blame for 
political and economic failures. 
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Non-Nuclear Deterrence 
The Military Doctrine also offers insights 
into how the Kremlin intends to respond 
to the identified risks. Moscow continues 
to rely on nuclear weapons for deterrence, 
asserting its right to use them in response 
to both nuclear attack and a large-scale 
conventional attack that threatens the 
existence of the Russian Federation. 
However, given the new conventional 
capabilities of the United States and for-
seeably also China, Moscow no longer 
regards nuclear deterrence as offering ad-
equate protection, and has therefore intro-
duced the new concept of “non-nuclear 
deterrence”. This means expanding its own 
network-centric and “global strike” capabil-
ities. The Chief of the General Staff, Valery 
Gerasimov, has already announced that the 
procurement programme for 2016–2020 
will place particular emphasis on precision 
weapons, information and reconnaissance 
systems, and automated command systems. 
Non-Linear Warfare 
While “non-nuclear deterrence” is primari-
ly intended as insurance against states with 
the most modern conventional capabilities, 
“non-linear warfare” is Moscow’s preferred 
military instrument for asserting its influ-
ence in the post-Soviet space. 
Although the specific term “non-linear 
warfare” does not actually appear in the 
Military Doctrine, Gerasimov explained in 
February 2013 what it means to the Russian 
leadership. In the twenty-first century, he 
said, the distinction between war and peace 
has become blurred because wars are no 
longer formally declared by states. This 
alters the rules of war, requiring what the 
Doctrine calls the “integrated use of mili-
tary force and of political, informational, 
and other non-military measures”. This 
approach is supplemented by indirect and 
asymmetrical forms of deployment, in the 
sense of the use of special forces, armed 
irregulars and private military companies. 
These means permit an open military inter-
vention to be disguised, as do “exploitation 
of protest potential within the population” 
and “externally financed and guided politi-
cal forces and social movements”. 
These concepts in fact describe rather 
precisely Russia’s actions in Ukraine. In 
view of the relative “success” the strategy 
has enjoyed in the eyes of the Russian 
leadership, it must be assumed that they 
will continue to expand these capacities. 
One indication is a strengthening of the 
special forces, with a dedicated “special 
operations command” established in 2013. 
Because “non-linear warfare” also involves 
armed units from the interior ministry, the 
ministry of emergency situations and the 
intelligence services, as well as defence 
ministry forces, the command systems for 
such a comprehensive approach have to be 
expanded. And that is precisely the purpose 
of the new National Defence Management 
Centre founded in December 2014. 
Mobilisation of Society and 
Economy 
The comprehensive stepping up of “mobili-
sational preparation” is a new aspect in the 
doctrine. The emphasis here is less on the 
armed forces themselves, than the mobili-
sation and disciplining of society and 
economy in an effort to block a “Maidan 
scenario” occurring in Russia. 
Special arrangements are provided for 
the financial sector and the fiscal and mon-
etary systems in the event of mobilisation. 
This gives the Kremlin instruments with 
which to intervene more efficiently in the 
economy in the event of crisis – as well 
as leverage to ensure the loyalty of the olig-
archs. 
In the interests of expediting the mobili-
sation of society, the Doctrine calls for a 
strengthening of “military-patriotic educa-
tion” and “improving” security in the 
sphere of information. Sharper interven-
tions in freedom of expression and the 
media, above all the internet, can thus be 
expected. The “Strategy for Countering Ex-
tremism” adopted in November 2014 also 
has the same thrust. 
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Fewer Oppportunities for 
Cooperation 
The Military Doctrine reflects the tense 
state of relations between Russia and the 
West. The potential for direct and indirect 
conflict results less from any flexing of 
military muscles such as Russian aircraft 
flying close to NATO borders or announce-
ments of arms purchases; ultimately, in 
view of the economic crisis, it is dubious 
whether the latter will be implemented in 
full. The real challenge consists in the “non-
linear warfare” that Moscow may in future 
apply in other post-Soviet states. NATO, and 
the European Union too, must find adequate 
responses. In the military sphere it is not 
helpful that conventional arms control has 
been deadlocked for years. In fact this is 
precisely the aspect that needs to be adapted 
to take account of “non-linear warfare”, for 
example by including other armed organs 
or permitting foreign observers to observe 
smaller exercises at least close to the bor-
ders. The question for the European Union 
will be above all to strengthen the resili-
ence of its eastern members and especially 
its post-Soviet partners, for example through 
a joint energy strategy or better integration 
of their Russian minorities. 
The second challenge is that shows of 
military strength may be compensating for 
internal as well as external weakness. If 
economic troubles lead to political crisis, 
Kremlin could be tempted to escalate con-
flicts with the West in order to justify inter-
ventions in economy and society. 
At the same time the opportunities for 
military cooperation with Russia are evapo-
rating. All that the new Doctrine mentions 
is a “dialogue of equals” with NATO and the 
United States – while intensifying coopera-
tion with Belarus, the Collective Security 
Treaty Organisation, the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organisation and the two separatist 
entities Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Nonetheless, Moscow’s new Doctrine 
still asserts interest in cooperating with the 
West on fighting terrorism and Islamist 
extremism, on reviving arms control and 
on strategic missile defence. NATO and the 
European Union should pragmatically 
grasp the opportunities for cooperation 
that exist there. But they should abandon 
the illusion that there could be positive 
spill-over effects for the general state of 
relations. 
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